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Fuel taxes have returned to centre stage as a potential policy instrument for greenhouse gas abatement. 
However critics have complained that a fuel tax is regressive. Such claims are based on few studies 
conducted in developed countries. This paper tests the validity of this claim for India. It uses data from 
a representative household survey covering more than 124 thousand Indian households. The study 
finds that a fuel tax is progressive. Using an input-output approach, this paper tries to study the 
distributional effect, once price change in non fuel goods (arising out of fuel tax) is considered. The 
progressivity result holds good even when one considers indirect consumption of fuel through its use 
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 1. Introduction 
The problem of climate change is increasingly being accepted as a major problem by policy makers 
round the world. Not only in Europe (where environmental issues have for long attracted the required 
attention of policy people) but even in countries like China, India and USA, there is a growing 
realization that the problem of global warming has reached an alarming stage and something is needed 
to be done about it.  Even to achieve modest targets like 550 parts per million by 2050, radical 
measures are required. Carbon Dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas, is estimated to be 
responsible for 64 percent of the greenhouse effect. Fossil fuels are the most important sources of 
carbon emissions and their use will have to be controlled to achieve any meaningful reduction in CO2 
emissions.  
India is the fourth largest emitter of CO2 worldwide. It is only next to United States, China and Russia 
in this respect. It accounts for about 4 percent of world CO2 emissions. With India growing at a rate of 
8% per annum compared to the world GDP growth rate of 5%, this share is expected to increase in 
future. Fossils fuels account for more than 95 percent of the CO2 emissions in India. Solid fuels 
(mainly coal) make up for more than two third of the emissions from fossil fuels. 
 












Figure1: CO2 emissions in India by Sectors 
(Source: http://earthtrends.wri.org ) 2.  Fuel Taxes as an Policy Instrument 
Although policy makers in United States and the developing world have often considered environmental taxes 
to be politically infeasible, Western Europe has for long experimented with environmental taxes: directly in the 
form of carbon taxes in 1990s (which was prematurely discarded) and indirectly in the form of fuel taxes. 
Though fuel taxes in many of these Western European countries were designed for non environmental reasons, 
it has been shown that they did have a significant environmental impact. Sterner (2007) reviews several studies 
and concludes “Had Europe not followed a policy of high fuel taxation but had low U.S. taxes, then fuel 
demand would have been twice as large”. Having calculated the hypothetical transport demand for the whole 
OECD area, Sterner concludes that fuel taxes are the single most powerful climate policy instrument 
implemented to date. 
However, fuel taxes have sometimes been criticized on distributional grounds. This has generated a popular 
perception that fuel taxes are regressive. The balance of academic evidence does not favour this view.  It was in 
early 90’s that the question of regressivity in fuel taxation was raised for the first time. A large number of 
people argued against fuel taxation on the ground that it imposes a larger burden on poor people. Such claims 
were based on studies that used the US data on petroleum consumption (KPMG Peat Marwick 1990). Santos 
and Catchesides (2005) found similar regressivity, but only among car users in United Kingdom. However, 
United States is hardly a representative country in this regard. USA is a county with very high incomes where 
even the poor households have cars- in fact it is the poor who own old, energy inefficient cars. Besides they live 
far away from urban areas and thus have to travel long distances to work in a country where there is very little 
public transport. Thus it is expected that fuel taxes will be regressive in United States. Regressivity in these 
initial studies is also conditioned by the fact that such studies are based on current income rather than current 
expenditure. Poterba (1990), Kasten and Sammartino (1988) suggested that the extent of regressivity of fuel 
taxation in USA was exaggerated by the year to year fluctuations in income among households at the bottom of 
the annual income distribution. Poterba (1990) argues that consumption expenditure is a better indicator of a 
household’s long run economic well being as it is less susceptible to shocks and hence incidence measures 
should be based on expenditure. Once that is done, gasoline tax ceases to be regressive. Poterba shows that 
when expenditure based measures are used the maximum incidence of gasoline tax is on middle expenditure 
deciles. 
Recently West (2004) showed that gasoline taxes in USA are regressive across higher income households only. 
For low levels of income it is progressive. Karl Steinger (2006) develops a computable general equilibrium 
model and finds that gasoline tax is progressive in Austria. Santos and Catchesides (2005) show that if all 
households (both with and without cars) are considered then the maximum burden of a gasoline tax is on the middle income households. Even this study is based on income and not on expenditure levels and thus their 
results might be biased in a way similar to the bias found in early studies in USA. 
Only a few papers on distributional effects of fuel taxation are based on data from developing countries. This is 
rather surprising because developing countries (especially countries making rapid progress like India, China and 
Brazil) are some of the largest emitter of CO2 in the world. Some work on the distributional impacts of fuel 
taxation has done on developing countries like South Africa and Mexico. Working with the Mexican data, 
Sterner and Lozada (2007) find that fuel taxation is strongly progressive if one takes only direct consumption of 
gasoline into account. However in poor countries, poor people generally use public transport more often than 
the rich. An increase in fuel prices is expected to change price of public transport significantly. This puts an 
indirect burden on users of public transport. If this is taken into account while calculating incidence of fuel 
taxation across expenditure deciles, fuel tax becomes neutral in Mexico. Ziramba shows that fuel taxation is 
progressive in South Africa independent of whether we consider indirect consumption through public transport. 
Kpodar (2006) shows that in Mali, the burden of an oil price hike is highest on the lowest and the highest 
income deciles. According to an ESMAP (2001) on Pakistan, the impact of a 33 percent gasoline and diesel 
price hike is regressive. Thus it is clear that there is no unanimous result on the regressivity issue. 
3.  Fuel Pricing Policy in India: 
With the objective of moving towards market determined prices for petroleum products, the government of 
India abolished the Administered Price Mechanism (APM) in April-2002.However, the Indian government 
continues intervention in the petroleum sector by absorbing state owned oil company losses. Market determined 
prices are considered to be politically infeasible by the political forces. 
Given that the government considers subsidization of cooking fuels to be an important social instrument in 
helping poorer households shift from biomass to modern fuel, the government in 2002 decided to continue 
providing subsidies for Liquid Petroleum Gas and Kerosene ex-ante in the budget. The Oil Marketing 
Companies (OMCs) were to adjust the retail selling prices of these products in line with international prices 
during this period. Subsidies were expected not to exceed 15% of the Gas-Import Parity Price and 33% of the 
kerosene-Import Parity Price. The government had even thought of abolishing all budget subsidies within 5 
years from 2002. However, in compliance with Government directions, the OMCs did not adjust prices of PDS 
kerosene and domestic LPG commensurately, resulting in losses on account of these two products. In October 
2003, Government decided that the OMCs would make good about a third of the losses on these two products 
from the surpluses generated by them on petrol and diesel while the balance losses would be shared equally by 
the upstream companies (ONGC/OIL/GAIL) and the OMCs.  In late 2003, international oil prices started rising rapidly and this burden sharing arrangement 
collapsed. This had two impacts: a) the burden of subsidy on PDS kerosene and domestic LPG 
increased sharply – the burden of subsidies in 2005-06 was Rs.15,000 crores on account of PDS 
kerosene and Rs. 11,000 crores on account of domestic LPG. The table below shows how implicit and 
explicit subsidies on PDS kerosene and LPG changed during the last six years: 
 
ITEM   PDS Kerosene (Rs. /Litre) 
    2002-03  2003-04 2004-05 2005-06(Est.) 
Subsidy from fiscal budget  2.45 1.65 0.82  0.82
“Under recoveries” to oil companies*  1.69 3.12 7.96  12.14
Total subsidy to consumer  4.14 4.77 8.78  12.96
   Domestic LPG (Rs./Cylinder) 
Subsidy from fiscal budget  67.75 45.18 22.58  22.58
“Under recoveries” to oil companies*  62.27 89.54 124.89  147.74
Total subsidy to consumer  130.02 134.72 147.47  170.32
*On the gross before adjusting amount shared by upstream companies 
Table 1: SUBSIDY ON PDS KEROSENE & DOMESTIC LPG (Source: Rangarajan Committee Report) 
 
Thus, since the abolition of APM, one witnesses a decline in the explicit component of subsidy (that is allotted 
for in the budget) and an increase in the implicit component. In 2004-05, the total subsidy on LPG and kerosene 
was Rs.20772 crores, where as the fiscal budget allotted for only Rs.2930 crores. Thus “Under Recoveries” 
constituted 85 percent of the subsidy. 
b) The government started interfering in the pricing of petrol and diesel. It restricted the pass through of 
international prices to domestic consumers. As a result the margins available to OMCs during 2002-04 on petrol 
and diesel thinned and then rapidly turned negative. In 2003-04, oil companies made an under recovery of Rs. 
2303 crores on petrol and diesel.  
Thus, five years since the dismantling of APM, India has not made much headway towards market pricing of 
petroleum products and gas. According to an UNDP-ESMAP report, without price subsidies, a LPG cylinder 
would have cost Rs469 and a litre of kerosene would have cost Rs. 16.54 in February 2003. The prices in 
presence of subsidies were Rs. 241 for 14.2 kg cylinder and Rs. 9 per litre of kerosene. 
However, contrary to popular belief, the fuel sector is not a story of one way flow of subsidies. While on the 
one hand subsidies are in place, the same commodities are subjected to various taxes. Both the Central 
Government and the state government impose taxes which pull up retail prices. While on one hand Oil PSU s 
are advised not to revise prices in conformity with crude rates, the government imposes excise duties and a 
plethora on other taxes on these items. The result is the Indian retail prices for petroleum and diesel are the highest in South East Asia. For cooking fuels, Budget subsidies are coupled with various central and state level 
taxes. The figure below shows the component of taxes in retail prices: 
PRODUCT Central  Taxes State Taxes Total Taxes
Petrol 38% 17% 55%
Diesel 23% 11% 44%
Domestic LPG  0% 11% 11%
PDS Kerosene  0% 4% 4%
Table2: COMPONENT OF TAXES IN RETAIL PRICE (Source: Rangarajan Committee Report) 
For cooking fuels the subsidies outweigh the taxes and the retail prices are lower than what they would have 
been in absence of any intervention. The same cannot be said about the transport fuels. 
Thus we see that even after abolition of APM, there has been substantial government intervention in the fuel 
sector. The imposing a fuel tax is not an administrative problem in this context. Such taxes will in turn be 
helpful in reducing emission externalities. 
4. Data 
Data on consumer expenditure on fuel and other commodities is obtained from the consumption schedule of the 
61
st round of the National Sample Survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization of the 
Government of India during the period July 2004- June 2005. This is one of the thick quinquennial rounds 
which have consumption expenditure information on more than 100,000 households. The sample for the 61st 
round consists of 124584 households. The rural sample consists of 79258 households and corresponding figures 
for the urban sample are 45326 households. The national sample survey uses a stratified two-stage sampling 
design, first sampling clusters (which are villages in rural areas and urban blocks in urban areas) and then 
selecting 10 (or 12 as in the case of the 55th round) households within each cluster (called FSUs or first-stage 
sampling units). Since NSS data does not have information on household income, we measure the incidence of 
a fuel tax across expenditure classes. Expenditure, in any case, is a better measure of long term economic 
welfare than income. In this paper, we use consumption figures based on 30 day recall for both non-durables 
and durables. 
In order to take into account the indirect consumption of fuels through its use as an intermediate input in the 
production of final goods, we use the Input-Output Tables of India prepared by the Central Statistical 
Organization of the Ministry of Statistics and Planning Implementation. We use two tables prepared at two 
different time points: 1998-1999 and 2003-2004. The 1998-1999 tables are used as it provides information for 
the energy sectors at a more disaggregated level. The table for the period  2003-04 includes transport fuels, 
kerosene, gas etc under the category “ petroleum products”, while the 1998-1999 tables has a separate category called “Gas” which includes Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Gobar Gas. The table for 1998-1999 provides 
disaggregated information on input output transaction of 115 sectors .However in order to make it compatible 
with the NSSO data; we have created an aggregated input output matrix which has information on 47 broad 
sectors (Details in Appendix A). This obviously introduces an element of error, but compatibility between 
NSSO data and CSO data demands such aggregation. The table for 2003-2004 has information for 130 sectors 
from which we have created an aggregated matrix of 46 sectors. 
5. Direct  Effects:   
•  Methodology  
An ideal measure of tax incidence should take into account all general equilibrium effects of a tax rise and then 
measure the impact of such changes on the household’s welfare. A tax leads to a shift in the supply curve of the 
commodity on which the tax is imposed. Unless we have a situation of perfect elasticity or inelasticity, the 
burden is shared between producers and sellers. A fall in producer price implies that factor demands and factor 
prices change. An increase in consumer price implies that the prices of goods which use the taxed commodity as 
an intermediate input rise in proportion to the cost share of the taxed commodity. This is just the beginning of 
several rounds of feedbacks. However to calculate incidence taking all general equilibrium effects into account, 
requires a great deal of information. Knowledge of the demand and supply elasticities of different industries and 
the distribution of ownership of firms in those industries is necessary. Most consumer expenditure surveys don’t 
provide us with such detailed information. Most measurements of tax incidence make simplifying assumptions. 
We start with the simplest of the measures. 
Let us consider a situation where the following conditions hold: 
(1) We assume that the production function of the taxed commodity shows fixed coefficient technology. 
Thus the supply curve of the taxed commodity is perfectly elastic. Consumers bear the entire burden of 
tax. 
(2) The taxed commodity is not an intermediate input and so does not change the price of any other 
commodity in the economy. This assumption will be relaxed later. 
(3) We assume inelastic Hicksian demand for fuel.  
Under assumptions (1), (2) and (3), we can comment on the progressivity or regressivity of tax just by looking 
at the budget share of the taxed commodity across income levels.  Under the assumption that the volume of demand is constant, budget share have an interesting interpretation. It 
is the fist-order indication of the magnitude of income effects resulting from price changes. For a given product, 
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Similarly assuming volume of demand to be constant, the direct effect of taxes on fuels can be expressed as a 
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where t denotes a generic fuel product, θt represents the budget share of the fuel product t and m is the total 
number of fuel products. Thus, under assumptions (1)-(3), we can test whether a tax on a particular fuel is 
regressive, simply by comparing the budget share of that fuel across different expenditure deciles. If the budget 
shares of the poor are higher than that of the rich, then we can conclude that a fuel tax is regressive.  
•  Results 
In a low income country, we may expect transport fuel taxes to be progressive since poor people don’t own 
cars. This is especially true for India were per capita income is just $620 and 75% of the population lives on less 
than two dollars a day. If domestic fuel use for cooking and lighting is also taken into account, the incidence 
results might not be progressive. However in India a large fraction of rural households use bio-fuels and does 
use fossil fuels for cooking purposes. However kerosene –an important petroleum product is widely used as 
lighting fuel. Thus it cannot be said for sure if cooking and lighting fuels will have distributional impacts 
different from that of transport fuels.  
The combined budget share of all fuel products (Coke-Coal, Petrol, Diesel, Kerosene, Gas etc) is seen to be 
higher for higher consumption deciles. The budget share of fuels stay constant for the first three deciles, but 
increases thereafter, indicating that an overall fuel tax would be strongly progressive. There is a difference of 
around 4% between the budget shares of highest and lowest decile. 
 
  
Figure 2: Budget shares of fuels (Transport + Cooking and Lighting Fuels) not taking into account indirect 
consumption through their use as intermediate inputs
1 
It will be interesting to see what is going on behind these figures. To see that we calculate the incidence results 
separately for transport fuels and cooking-lighting fuels. 
From figure3, it is seen that the budget share of all cooking fuels stay unchanged for low levels, but starts 
increasing after the third decile. It falls substantially for the highest decile. If we consider kerosene and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas, then the kerosene’s budget share decreases with consumption while budget share of 
LPG increases with consumption. The budget share for gas falls substantially for the last decile. This is 
expected because in India only the urban non poor use gas as a cooking fuel 
 
Figure 3: Budget shares of cooking and lighting fuels, not taking into account indirect consumption through 
their use as intermediate inputs 
                                                  
1 The market exchange rate of the Indian Rupee is 1 US dollar=Rs.40.42 (March 07,2008)Based on new statistical 
calculations of purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates published in 2005 by the International Comparison Program 
(ICP) of the IMF, the PPP adjusted exchange for India Rs14.7 / PPP adjusted US dollar The budget share of all cooking fuels stay unchanged for low levels, but starts increasing after the third decile. 
It falls substantially for the highest decile. If we consider kerosene and Liquefied Petroleum Gas, then the 
kerosene’s budget decreases with income while Budget shares of LPG increases with consumption. The budget 
share for gas falls substantially for the last decile. This is expected because in India only the urban non poor use 
gas as a cooking fuel.  
It will be interesting to note the differences between the urban and the rural sector as the two sectors have very 
different patterns of fuel use. Figure 4 and 5 separately show the incidence results for rural and urban sectors. In 
rural India, very few households use gas. (Only 2 percent of the poorest 25 percent households use gas as their 
main cooking fuel, the figure increases to 30percent for the last quartile). Only people in the upper end of 
expenditure distribution use gas. The budget shares increase with the level of expenditure. Kerosene is the 
popular lighting fuel in rural areas, especially for the poor. As consumption increases people move towards 
electricity, subject to it’s availability in villages. For cooking purposes bio-fuels are generally used. With an 
increase in income people start shifting towards more convenient fuels like kerosene and gas. However 
substitution towards LPG is low as availability of LPG is a problem. Thus the budget shares of kerosene fall 
with income.  
In the urban sector electricity is used for lighting, almost universally. Only 10% of urban Indian households do 
not state electricity to be their main lighting fuel. This ten percent of urban households (the majority of whom 
come from the lowest decile) use kerosene. 
 
Figure 4: Budget shares of cooking and lighting fuels for the rural sector, not taking into account indirect 
consumption through their use as intermediate inputs  
Figure 5: Budget shares of cooking and lighting fuels for the urban sector, not taking into account indirect 
consumption through their use as intermediate inputs 
On the other hand poor urban households use firewood and chips or kerosene as their main cooking fuel. As 
income increases, a larger proportion of households use LPG. However the curve for LPG is inverted U shaped. 
It increases till the 6
th decile but falls thereafter. Thus tax on LPG will be progressive initially, but becomes 
regressive for higher levels of income. The middle income group in urban areas bears the maximum burden of 
such a tax. 
Assuming that the subsidy is same on all units of kerosene sold through PDS, the table shows the distribution of 
existing subsidies on cooking fuels: 
   Kerosene  LPG 
DECILE RURAL URBAN RURAL   URBAN 
1 0.38 0.43 0.00 0.19 
2 0.48 0.54 0.01 0.57 
3 0.52 0.55 0.02 0.87 
4 0.53 0.50 0.04 1.26 
5 0.56 0.47 0.07 1.53 
6 0.60 0.44 0.11 1.97 
7 0.63 0.28 0.17 2.23 
8 0.65 0.32 0.28 2.54 
9 0.67 0.24 0.55 2.84 
10 0.60 0.12 1.32 3.37 
 
Table 3: Monthly Consumption of Subsidized Kerosene (litres)/Subsidized LPG (Kgs.) per household 
*calculated by the author from 2004-05 NSSO Data When seen by decile group, per capita purchases of PDS kerosene steadily increase with expenditure decile in 
rural areas. The rural subsidy is therefore distributed in favour of the rich. In the urban sector, per capita 
purchases of PDS kerosene peak in the middle decile groups and then slowly decline until they fall off sharply 
in the top deciles. The third and fourth column in this table reflects the distribution of LPG subsidy. As might be 
expected the per capita consumption of LPG increases with expenditure decile. The disparity between urban and 
rural consumption is large, reflecting that currently the subsidy is distributed in favour of the urban sector. 
 
Now we look at transport fuels. Most of the literature on the distributional effects of “fuel tax” concentrates on 
transport fuels like gasoline. In the figure below we consider the two major transport fuels: Petrol (Gasoline) 
and Diesel. Other transport fuels are rarely used in India. It is only in cities like Delhi that the public transport 
fleet uses cleaner fuels like CNG. 
 
Figure 6: Budget shares of transport fuels, not taking into account indirect consumption through their use as 
intermediate inputs 
As is evident from the figure above, the budget shares of transport fuels are strictly increasing with 
consumption. This is expected in a poor country like India (per capita income of $620 in 2004) as only the very 
rich can have access to transport fuels. A large majority of Indian households (more than 80% according to 61
st 
round NSS data) do not buy either petrol or diesel. 
The figures for the urban sector show that progressivity is much greater in the urban sector. This is expected as 
most households with access to private transport are situated in the urban sector. The curve for diesel is almost 
flat, showing some upward slope for top consumption deciles. It is very close to zero showing that a negligible 
amount of Indian households use diesel vehicles for private transport.  
Figure 7: Budget shares of transport fuels for the rural sector, not taking into account indirect consumption 
through their use as intermediate inputs  
 
Figure 8: Budget shares of transport fuels for urban sector, not taking into account indirect consumption through 
their use as intermediate inputs  
However it should be borne in mind that the results above are obtained when we assume the direct consumption 
of fuels by various households. Though such results are interesting they are only half of the entire stories. 
Transport Fuel is an important input in the production of most goods that are mechanically produced. When 
households consume good which use fuel as an input, they indirectly consume fuel. When such indirect 
consumption is taken into account, the regressivity or progressivity results might be overturned.  
We give an illustrative example to explain this. Let us consider the example of coal consumption. We have seen 
earlier that the budget shares of coke and coal are highest for middle consumption groups. However coal is an 
important input in the production of energy. If we consider the indirect consumption of coal through energy use, the distributional effects might change. We make calculations of incidence by incorporating the effects of 
indirect consumption into account. We make this calculation by making two assumptions: Firstly we assume 
that higher order effects are missing. An increase in coal price increases just the input cost of electricity. Any 
increase in the price of other inputs due to rise in price of coal is ignored. Secondly, we assume demand for coal 
and electricity to be inelastic (this assumption is sufficient but not necessary for our purpose). Under these 
assumptions, we calculate the indirect budget shares which are defined as follows: 
Indirect Budget Share of Coal = Direct Budget Share of Coal + 
Cost Share of Coal in the Production of Electricity × Direct Budget Share of Electricity…………………… (1) 
Let the direct cost share of coal in production of electricity as reported by CSO input-output table is 10 percent. 
Even such a low value flips the results:  
 
Figure9: Budget Shares of coal accounting for its use as an input in electricity generation when cost share in 
electricity generation is 0.4 
Thus once indirect consumption of coal is included we get mild progressivity. For higher values, which are more 
realistic, we get strong progressivity. 
6. Including  Indirect  Effects: 
•  Methodology 
Thus indirect consumption can play an important role in determining distributional effects of fuel tax. Thus an 
appropriate measure should take into account the price changes happening in the various sectors happening in the 
economy, and calculate the tax burden arising from price changes for different consumption deciles. To calculate 
the economy wide price changes we at first use the Input Output Coefficient matrix 1998-99 published by the Central Statistical Organization. This is because compared to the latest 2003-2004 matrix; the 1998-99 matrix 
provides energy sector information at a more disaggregated level. The original matrix for 1998-1999 has 
disaggregated information on 115 sectors. We add a new sector called kerosene to these 115 sectors. We assume 
that kerosene input requirements of kerosene is similar to that of petroleum products. This is a reasonable 
assumption on the ground that the chemical composition of kerosene is similar to that of other petroleum products 
like transportation fuels. We also assume that kerosene does not enter into the production of any other 
commodity. The only conceivable intermediate use of kerosene is its use in adulterating transport diesel. 
According to a study carried out by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and 
commissioned by the petroleum and natural gas ministry, 35 percent of the total amount of kerosene distributed in 
the country through PDS is diverted. The study further found out that of the volume diverted, 18% is used to 
adulterate diesel. Thus around 6 percent of the total kerosene supply is diverted to adulterate diesel. Given that the 
price of diesel is almost thrice that of kerosene supplied through PDS, the cost share of kerosene in diesel is less 
than one percent, around 0.4 percent.
2 As kerosene is not used to adulterate non diesel transport fuels, the cost 
share of diesel in transport fuels will be even lower. Thus it is safe to make the assumption that kerosene is not 
used as an intermediate input. However for the 2003-04 matrix this paper don’t make any such assumption and 
works with the aggregated sector called “Petroleum Products” which includes transport fuels, gas and kerosene. 
In order to make it compatible with the 61
st round NSS data we use an aggregated matrix. For the 1998-99 matrix 
the numbers of sectors have been reduced to 48, while for the 2003-04 matrix it is 46. The method and pattern of 
aggregation has been described in the Appendix A and B. Before describing the theoretical framework of 
calculating price changes we mention two things: Firstly, when we use the 1998-1999 matrix, there is a five year 
gap between the date of the input-output table and consumption survey. But this is the best that can be done with 
the data currently available. We will later use the input-output table for 2003-2004 to show that the results do not 
change appreciably, at least at an aggregative level. Secondly, the aggregation of sector also introduces an 
element of error. But the effect is expected to be marginal. 
Now we develop the theoretical framework required to calculate tax burden taking price changes of all sectors 
into account. We work with two frameworks: one in which the economy is assumed to be closed and indirect 
taxes are advalorem and another in which the economy is assumed to be a small open economy with unit taxes. 
 
                                                  
2 The total sales of diesel and kerosene in India are about 40milion tones and 9.5 million tones respectively. If  6 percent of 
kerosene  is diverted to adulterate diesel and the price of diesel is thrice that of kerosene, then the cost share is                     
( (9.5 × 0.06)/40)×0.33 =0.004 When the closed economy assumption is made, the framework described below is used: 
•  Closed (Autarkic) Economy 
Let A be the 48 X 48 input output matrix.  
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where n = 48 and a ij is the quantity of i
th sector output used to produce 1 unit of commodity j. 
Let the price formation equation be 






T-T) n×n P n × 1 =VA n × 1 …………………………………………………………………....... (2) 
 where 
•  n= 47 
•  I is a n×n identity matrix 
•  T is a n ×n diagonal matrix with tax rates in the diagonal 
•  P and VA are column vectors showing prices and value added of the 47 sectors. 
 
Let us assume that the tax of the i
th commodity changes by dt i. Then system of equations depicting price change 
is: 
(I –A
T-T) n ×n dP n ×1 = Pi dt i e i ……………………………………………………….……………… (3) 
where e i is a column vector with 1 in the i
th
   place and 0 in every other place  
Taking inverse (assuming inverse exists) we have, 
dP n ×1 = Pi dt i (I –A
T-T) 
-1 e i …………………………………………………………….……..…...... (4) The tax burden of the k 
th  household is  






e   T) - A -   (I     X
]…..…………………………………………………….………....   (5) 
where X k is the (1×n) vector of quantities purchased by household k and Yk is consumption expenditure of 
household k. Denote the term within parenthesis by S k. This can be interpreted as the share of commodity i in 
household k’s expenditure taking all indirect effects into account.  
Since the terms outside the parenthesis are same for all households, we only need to calculate the term within to 
comment of distribution of tax burden. Information on X k and Y k is obtained from NSSO data while information 
about other matrices is obtained from CSO input output table. The CSO input output transaction matrix is actually 
the cost share matrix {C i j} n x n where C i j= a ij × (P i/ P j). We chose physical units in such a way that initially 
(before tax) P 1=P 2=……=P n=1 .Given this assumption {C i j} n × n is the same as {A i j} n   n and the tax burden 
can be easily calculated. We can calculate it for each household corresponding to tax changes in coal, natural gas, 
kerosene and petroleum products.  
×
•  Small Open Economy 
Let A and M be the n X n input output matrix and n×n import matrix respectively:  
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where   is the amount of input i (both domestic and imported) used in production of commodity j and  is the 
amount of imported input i used in production of commodity j. Now define a new matrix of domestic input use as: 
ij a ij m
D=  { }
n n ij d
× = A- M where  is the amount of domestically produced commodity i used in the production of 
output j. We assume that domestically produced input and imported input are imperfect substitutes .Each one of 
them is required in a fixed amount to produce one unit output i. They being differentiated commodities, prices 
difference between them can exist. The price of imported inputs is determined in the international markets, and 
are unaffected by domestic taxes. We also assume that the value added per unit of output is unchanged. 
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where  is the domestic price of i 
th good ,  is the international price of the imported version of good i ,  is 
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where  is a column vector with 1 at the i
th row and 0 at every other row.  i e
The tax burden of the k 
th  household is  
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d
i dt
where X k is the (1×n) vector of quantities purchased by household k and Yk is consumption expenditure of 
household k. Denote the term within parenthesis by S k.  
Since the terms outside the parenthesis are same for all households, we only need to calculate the term within to 
comment of distribution of tax burden. Information on X k and Y k is obtained from NSSO data while information 
about other matrices is obtained from CSO input output table. The CSO input output transaction matrix is actually 
the cost share matrix {C i j} n x n where C i j= a ij × (P i/ P j). We chose physical units in such a way that initially 
(before tax) P 1=P 2=……=P n=1 .Given this assumption {C i j} n × n is the same as {A i j} n   n. From this matrix 
we deduct the import matrix to obtain the domestic input use matrix.  Once this information is available we can 




 •  Results 
Results corresponding to closed economy model when 1998-1999 input output data is used: 
The indirect budget shares (S k) of fuel for different consumption classes are as follows: 
 
Figure 10: Tax incidence across consumption groups, taking indirect consumption of fuel into account. 
The figure shows that inclusion of indirect consumption hardly affects the progressivity results. For example, the 
progressivity of a gas tax remains unchanged (Figure 6). Inclusion of indirect consumption flips a few regressivity 
results that we had obtained earlier. Earlier the budget share of coal was highest for the middle deciles and was 
low at the two ends (Figure 3). However inclusion of indirect consumption yields progressivity. This result is 
quite intuitive. Coal is an important input in the production of energy and manufacturing sector. The rich spend a 
much bigger proportion of their total expenditure on energy and consumer goods. This in turn changes the earlier 
result. The shape of the gas curve is almost unchanged. It suggests strong progressivity till the ninth decile. The 
indirect budget shares drop abruptly for the topmost decile. The budget shares for petroleum products are almost 
unchanged for the first few deciles .They start increasing thereafter.  Thus at an All India level, taxes on all the 
three items are progressive. However as kerosene is assumed not to enter into production of any other good, the 
total incidence curve mimics the earlier direct budget share curve. A combined tax on the four items yield strong 
progressivity as is evident from the topmost curve. 
We now take a look at the rural and urban sector separately as the two sectors have very different patterns of fuel 
use.  
Figure 11: Incidence for rural sector, taking the impact through intermediate use of fuels into account 
The results from the rural sector are quite straightforward. Taxes on Petroleum Products and Gas are strongly 
progressive, while taxes on coal are very weakly progressive. 
 
Figure 12: Incidence for urban sector, taking the impact through intermediate use of fuels into account 
Tax on kerosene is regressive. The results from the urban sector are much more interesting. Budget Shares for 
petroleum products increase with consumption. Burden of a coal tax is constant (slightly increasing) across 
deciles, implying weak progressivity. The incidence curve for gas is inverted U shaped, implying highest tax 
burden on the middle expenditure groups.  
 
 Results corresponding to closed economy model when 2003-2004 input output data is used: 
We now do similar calculations for tax incidence by using the 2003-2004 input output matrix. As noted earlier, 
the new table provides information about the energy sector at an aggregated level. Thus we have incidence results 
for coal, petroleum products (which includes gas, kerosene and transport fuels) and fuel as a whole.  
 
Figure 13: Incidence of Fuel Taxes, taking the impact through intermediate use of fuels into account 
(Calculated using 2003-2004 Input Output Table) 
 
The progressivity results remains unchanged when we use 2003-2004 input output data. A coal tax is still weakly 
progressive. The tax burden is now marginally lower than the figures obtained earlier. This might be a result of 
lowering of coal intensity of production or decrease in coal prices. Tax on petroleum products is strongly 
progressive. The magnitude of tax burden is much higher now. This might be the reflection of the steep increase 
in price of petroleum products since the abolition of administered price mechanism in the beginning of 21
st 
century and the reduction of subsidies that followed it. The figures below show the incidence results separately 
for the rural and urban sector.  
Figure 14: Incidence of fuel taxes for rural sector, taking the impact through intermediate use of fuels into account 
 
Figure 15: Incidence of fuel taxes for urban sector, taking the impact through intermediate use of fuels into 
account 
In the rural sector tax burden due to a petroleum product tax increases with consumption level .The effect of a 
coal tax increases marginally with per capita consumption levels. In the urban sector, the coal tax is almost neutral 
but the curve depicting the burden of a tax on petroleum products is inverted U shaped, suggesting maximum 
burden at the middle levels of per capita expenditure. The results obtained from 1998-1999 input-output data 
suggested that the curve for gas is inverted U shaped. The curvature of the petroleum products curve might be due 
to this peculiar incidence pattern of a gas tax. 
 
 
 Results corresponding to open economy model when 2003-2004 input output data is used: 
We now use the open economy framework and the data from 2003-04 Input-Output table and 61
st round NSS to 
calculate incidence results. In this section the results are discussed in greater detail in order to decipher the story 
behind the incidence results. The poor have low budget shares for petroleum products (except kerosene) and 
high budget shares for coal, compared to the rich. In spite of that, the fact that fuel prices affect prices of other 
commodities and the possibility that the poor might have high budget shares for such commodities, may change 
the direction of the incidence results. For example, the poor might be affected adversely if food prices are 
highly sensitive to fuel prices. The fact that the budget share of food for the poor is high might depress the 
progressivity result obtained earlier. The table below gives the difference in the budget shares of the last and the 
first decile for some important sectors: 
Sector   Budget Share 
of First Decile 
Budget Share 
of tenth Decile 
Difference in 
Shares 
Major Food Crops and their products  33.17 7.15  -26.02
Other Crops  13.73 7.18  -6.55
Milk and Milk Products  3.01 7.13  4.12
Forestry and Logging  7.3 0.04  -7.26
Coal and Lignite  0.04 0.02  -0.02
Edible Oil  5.95 2.44  -3.51
Textiles 1.36 4.84  3.48
Petroleum Products  2.4 6.51  4.11
Health 2.46 7.32  4.86
Toiletries 6.19 3.38  -2.81
Electricity 1.53 4.14  2.61
Transport Services  1.82 4.01  2.19
Other Services and Communication  0.03 10.11  10.08
Hotels and restaurants  0.42 4.66  4.24
Ownership of Dwellings  0.11 6.91  6.8
Education 0.37 3.61  3.24
Table 4: Share of Consumption Expenditure of the two extreme deciles for some sectors 
The table above shows that the “poor” have a higher budget share for food items, forestry and logging, coal and 
lignite, edible oil and toiletries, compared to the rich. These sectors have the potential to depress the 
progressivity obtained earlier (by comparing direct budget shares), only if the products of these sectors are 
highly sensitive to fuel prices. On the other hand textiles, petroleum products, health, electricity, transport 
services, other services, education, Hotels and restaurants and education have lower budget shares for the poor, 
compared to the rich. The following figures show the price changes in all sectors in response to an increase in 
the unit tax on coal by one unit. . 
Price Changes due to Coal Tax
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Figure 16: Price Changes of Commodities in other Sectors due to coal tax 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the 2003-2004 Input Output Matrix 
We see that food items, forestry and logging, edible oil and toiletries are not very responsive to a coal tax. On the 
other hand sectors like electricity are highly responsive to a coal tax. Thus electricity consumption can have an 
important role in determining the incidence of a coal tax.  Now we look at the impact of a petroleum product tax 
on the prices across the economy. Price Changes due to tax on Petroleum Products
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Figure 17 : Price Changes of Commodities in other Sectors due to petroleum products tax 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the 2003-2004 Input Output Matrix 
We see that cereals and non cereal food crops, forestry and logging, edible oil and toiletries are not very 
responsive to a petroleum product tax. On the other hand sectors like electricity and transport services are highly 
responsive to such a tax. Thus electricity and transport services consumption can have an important role in 
determining the incidence of a petroleum products tax.  The results from the analysis are as follows:  
Figure 18: Incidence results from open economy model 
The above figure shows that a coal tax is almost neutral. It shows no monotonic movement with increase in per 
capita consumption. Thus indirect effects are negligible or the positive and the negative effects cancel out each 
other. The bulk of indirect expenditure effect comes through increases in food expenditures. In spite of the food 
price hike being small, the huge budget share of food in the budget of poor depresses “progressivity gains” made 
from other commodities like electricity, textiles etc. The incidence curve of a petroleum tax is increasing at least 
for the first seven deciles. Then it dips a bit, but only marginally. As in the case of coal tax, food expenditure has 
a huge indirect effect. It depresses the progressivity result. However in the case of petroleum products, it is unable 
to wash away the positive contribution of transport, electricity, health, electronic goods towards progressivity. We 
now look at the rural and urban sector respectively: 
 
Figure 19: Incidence results for rural sector from open economy model 
  
Figure 20: Incidence results for urban sector from open economy model 
The results from the two sectors are in expected lines with a coal tax being almost neural in both cases and 
petroleum products tax being progressive. However in urban sector, at high levels of expenditure the burden of 
petroleum tax falls marginally. 
Thus we see that inclusion of indirect consumption keep the major results of earlier analysis unchanged. However 
all our calculations are based on the assumption of perfectly elastic supply curves (arising out of the assumption 
of a Leontief fixed coefficient technology) and perfectly inelastic demand curves. Before making strong 
statements we need to check if demand responses change the strong progressivity results. The assumption of 
inelastic demand elasticity generally overstates the incidence results of groups with high elasticities. If one makes 
the reasonable assumption that the poor have higher price elasticity for energy and luxuries, which are fuel 
intensive, then any consideration of demand sensitivity will strengthen our progressivity results. On the supply 
side, substitution against fuel in response to a fuel price rise will reduce the burden on groups which have a higher 
indirect consumption of fuel. 
6. Sensitivity  Checks 
Till now we have assumed that demand is inelastic. This is highly unrealistic but the strength of the progressivity 
results seem to suggest that the results will remain unaltered even when we allow for elastic demand. We carry 
out a sensitivity analysis using elasticity estimates from different studies to test if that is indeed the case. The 
estimates are obtained from different sources and are often not representative at an all India level. Thus they have 
problems of comparability. However the purpose of these checks is to show that the progressivity results don’t 
change for “reasonable” values of elasticity. One requires extreme values of elasticities to change the results. Since it is not possible to obtain on price, cross price and income elasticity estimates for all the 48 commodities 
that we have considered earlier, we aggregate further and consider only 5 commodities: Coal, Gas, Petroleum 
Products, Kerosene and Others (Non Fuel Consumption). 
Let the goods be X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5. The demand functions are as follows:  
Xi = Xi (Pi, P-i, M) for all i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5……………………………………………………………………...….. . (6) 
From the theory of demand we know that demand elasticities satisfy two conditions:  










where eji is the uncompensated price elasticity of commodity i with respect to price of commodity j. 
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Let there be two classes: Rich (R) and Poor (P). For a tax on commodity i to be progressive we require 
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where  is the budget share of the i




If we don’t make the above assumption, progressivity requires 
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If we make the assumption (made earlier) that  ; then the condition reduces to  k i j
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This is exactly what we had done earlier to find regressivity in most fuels. We know that energy use patterns in urban and rural sectors are quite different. Hence it might be expected that 
the elasticity values are different for these sectors. Thus we test the progressivity results separate for the urban and 
rural sector. We already have budget shares for each decile. We consider an average individual of the poorest 
decile to represent the poor and an average individual of the richest decile to represent the . 
We start with the Rural Sector: the budget shares for the average individual from first and last decile are as 
follows:  







Table 2: Direct Budget Shares for the “Poor” and the “Rich”in Rural Sector 
The tables below shows the Hicksian own price and cross price elasticities for different commodities, for the rich 
and poor. Information on the source of estimates is given in Appendix C. 
      Prices 
   Coal  Pet  Gas  Kerosene  Others 
Coal -0.126 0.000 0.843 0.712 -1.429 
Pet 0.000 -0.420 0.000 0.000 0.420 
Gas 0.596 0.000 -0.484 0.470 -0.582 








Others -0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.015 -0.005 
Hicksian Elasticities 
Table 3A: Compensated elasticity estimates of different commodities for Rural Poor. 
      Prices 
   Coal  Pet  Gas  Kerosene  Others 
Coal -0.330 0.000 0.565 0.495 -0.730 
Pet 0.000 -0.390 0.000 0.000 0.390 
Gas 0.520 0.000 -0.512 0.458 -0.466 








Others -0.012 0.009 0.009 -0.003 -0.004 
Table 3B: Compensated elasticity estimates of different commodities for Rural Rich. 
  Using this value of elasticities from tables 13A and 13B, we see if a coal, petroleum products, gas and kerosene 
tax satisfies condition (15). For the rural sector, we find that petroleum products and gas satisfies the condition of 
progressivity and kerosene violates it .For Coal the Left hand side expression of condition (15) is almost zero, 
hence it’s neutral.  
We now look at the Urban Sector: the budget shares for the average individual from first and last decile are as 
follows:  









Table 4: Direct Budget Shares for the “Poor” and the “Rich” in Urban Sector 
The tables below shows the Hicksian own price and cross price elasticities for different commodities, for the rich 
and poor. Information on the source of estimates is given in Appendix C. 
      Prices 
   Coal  Pet  Gas  Kerosene  Others 
Coal 0.005 0.000 0.653 0.028 -0.687 
Pet 0.000 -0.419 0.000 0.000 0.419 
Gas 0.661 0.000 -0.447 0.604 -0.818 








Others -0.001 0.001 0.016 -0.008 -0.009 
 
Table 3A: Compensated elasticity estimates of different commodities for Urban Poor. 
   Prices 
   Coal  Pet  Gas  Kerosene  Others 
Coal 0.005 0.000 0.384 0.028 -0.418 
Pet 0.000 -0.418 0.000 0.000 0.418 
Gas 0.507 0.000 -0.519 1.102 -1.090 








Others -0.001 0.001 0.016 -0.008 -0.009 
 
 Table 3B: Compensated elasticity estimates of different commodities for Urban Rich. 
 For urban sector, tax on transport fuel is strongly progressive as it satisfies condition (15) by a big margin. 
However the other three fuels are regressive. Gas we note had an inverted U shaped direct budget share curve for 
the urban sector. It still might be inverted U shaped. It is just that the top most decile has a lower burden than the 
lowest decile. 
Conclusion 
Fuel taxes for environmental purposes have often faced skepticism and criticism on the grounds of regressivity. 
This paper shows that such criticisms do not apply to a low-income country like India. Taxes on transport fuels 
(petrol and diesel) are highly progressive for both urban and rural sector. A tax on coal is neutral for rural sector 
while being slightly regressive for urban sector, due to its use as an intermediate input. However, cooking fuels 
like kerosene and gas show signs of non regressivity. While a tax on kerosene is regressive for both urban and 
rural sector, the results for gas differ within sectors. While a tax on gas is strongly progressive for the rural sector, 
it imposes maximum burden on the middle expenditure groups of the urban sector.  
These results of this paper can be used in different ways, depending on the policy objective of the government and 
tax authority. The objective of an environmental tax is to reduce emissions by reducing consumption of fuel. 
Thus, unlike a tax imposed for revenue purposes, an environmental tax should be imposed on fuels with elastic 
demand and on fuels with emission potential. Transport fuels satisfy these criteria and are thus an appropriate case 
for a fuel tax for environmental purposes. They have high emission potential with each litre of transport fuel 
emitting around 2.3 kilograms of carbon dioxide per litre of fuel. According Thomas Sterner (2007), while the 
elasticity of transport fuels are inelastic in the short run, they respond to price changes in the long run and have a 
long run elasticity of -0.84. However studies by Ramanathan and Geetha (1998) report a lower elasticity value of 
-0.42, which is still sensitive to price changes. In addition the results of this study show that a tax on transport fuel 
is progressive. The results hold good even when indirect consumption is considered. Thus a tax imposed on 
transport fuels achieves the desired objective of emission reduction without having any adverse distributional 
effects, thus making a strong case for transport fuel taxation. 
The issue of taxing cooking and lighting fuel is a little more complex and it is difficult to make an unqualified 
recommendation for a tax. Contrary to popular perception, studies by Gundimeda and Kohlin (2006) show that 
elasticities of cooking and lighting fuels are not low for all sections of the society. According to their study, the 
elasticity of gas is close to unity for almost all sections of the society, ranging from -0.92 for the urban rich to-
1.05 for the urban poor. However, gas is a cleaner fuel compared to its counterparts and thus the case for a gas tax 
(or equivalently, the case for a removal of gas subsidy) is not strong in spite of the fact that such a tax is 
progressive. The case for a gas tax becomes reasonable only when the government can couple it with incentives for using electricity for cooking purpose. At present, use of electricity for cooking purposes is rare and thus the 
case for a gas tax is not strong.  
In India, kerosene is an important cooking and lighting fuel. While urban household use kerosene as a cooking 
fuel, rural households use it for lighting purposes. The demand for kerosene is responsive to prices especially in 
the rural sector. It ranges from -0.7 for the rural rich to -0.5 for he middle expenditure group. As a lighting source, 
kerosene is of poorer quality and is more expensive than electricity (Barnes, Plas and Floor, 1997). The results 
from this paper show that a tax on kerosene is regressive for both the sectors and a major reason for the observed 
regressivity in rural sector is that 35% of rural households use kerosene primarily to light their homes. Besides 
regressivity, a tax on kerosene has other aspects of concern. Any tax on kerosene causes the poor to substitute 
towards fuelwood, which has strong adverse health implications and can also lead to deforestation. According to 
Gundimeda and Kohlin (2006), a percent increase in kerosene price increases fuel wood use by 0.7 percent 
increase in fuelwood use for the rural poor and 0.4 percent for the urban poor. Thus, any tax proposal should be 
preceded by compensatory proposals for the poor. This can take the form of targeted electricity and LPG subsidy 
for the poor and should be coupled by a program of rural electrification. The targeted gas subsidy might also help 
in forest conservation as has been pointed out by Baland et. al (2006). 
It has now been well documented that the emission scenario of most developing countries reflects a sad state of 
climate injustice. “Hiding behind the poor”-A report by Greenpeace India show ,when it comes to CO2 emissions, 
a relatively small wealthy class of 1% of the population in India is hiding behind a huge proportion of 823 million 
poor people. They go on to show that it is India’s poor who keep per capita CO2 emissions really low. Thus it is 
natural that a policy designed to tackle GHG emission should impose a larger burden on the rich. The evidence 
from this study shows that an environmental fuel tax does just that. The progressivity result is robust to the 
inclusion of indirect fuel consumption. Thus it a bit surprising that people speaking for the Indian underclass in 
the polity often come down heavily on any proposal of fuel price hike, on the grounds that it imposes higher 
burden on the poor. While this is true for kerosene, it is not true for any other fuel. 
One of the limitations of this paper is that we don’t allow for dynamics in the supply side. If the supply curve is 
elastic a part of the tax burden will be transferred to the producers. This will in turn lead to adjustment in the 




 Appendix A: Procedure for aggregating the (115 X 115) matrix of 1998-1999 into a 47 X 47 matrix. 
The aggregation of 115 sectors into 47 broad sectors follows the following pattern:  
FINAL 
SECTORS  FINAL SECTOR NAMES 
COMPONENT SECTORS NUMBER 
from CSO ’s original table 
#1  FOOD CROPS and their products 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
#2  OTHER CROPS  8,9,10,11,14,15,16,17
#3  TEA AND COFFEE  12,13,37
#4  MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS  18
#5  ANIMAL SERVICES (AGRICULTURAL)  19
#6  OTHER LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS  20,22
#7  FORESTRY AND LOGGING  21
8  COAL AND LIGNITE  23
9  CRUDE PETROLEUM, NATURAL GAS  24
10  IRON ORE  25
11  OTHER MINERALS  26,27,28,29,30,31,32
#12  SUGAR  33,34
#13  EDIBLE OIL  35,36
#14  MISC. FOOD PRODUCTS  38
#15  BEVERAGES  39
#16  TOBACCO PRODUCTS  40
#17  TEXTILES 41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49
#18  FURNITURE AND FIXTURES AND WOODEN GOODS.  50,51
#19  STATIONARY  52,53
#20  LEATHER AND RUBBER PRODUCTS  54,55,56
#21  MISC. MANUFACTURING  57,97,98.
#22  PETRO PRODUCTS  58
23  COAL TAR PRODUCTS  59
24  HEAVY CHEMICALS  60,61
25 
OTHER CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL GOODS and 
CEMENT  .62,63,64,67,68
#26  HEALTH  113,65
#27  TOILETRIES  66
28  NON METALIC MINERAL PRODUCTS  69,71.
29  CEMENT  70
#30  METAL PRODUCTS  72,73,74,75,76,77.
31  AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY  78
32  OTHER MACHINERY (MAINLY INDUSTRIAL)  79-83
#33 
ELECTRICAL,ELECTRONIC MACHINERY AND 
APPLIANCES 84,85,86,87,88,89,90.
#34  (PERSONAL) TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 91,92,93,94,95,96.
35  CONSTRUCTION  99
#36  ELECTRICITY  100
#37  GAS  101
#38  WATER SUPPLY  102#39  TRANSPORT SERVICES  103,104
40  STORAGE WAREHOUSING  105
41  OTHER SERVICES AND COMMUNICATION.  114,106
42  TRADE  107
#43  HOTELS AND RESTURANTS  108
44  BANKS AND INSURANCE  109,110
45  OWNERSHIP OF DWELLINGS  111
#46  EDUCATION  112
47  PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  115
 
NB. # denotes categories for which NSS has household consumption information. For other categories, 
household consumption is zero.   
Now, let small letters denote component sectors from the original 115 sectors and capital letters denote the 
aggregated sectors from final (47 X 47) matrix. 
Let X ij denote flows from sector i to sector j. 
      Yi denote final demand for sector i 
      Xi denote total output of sector i 





Let X IJ denote flows from sector I to sector J 
      YI denote final demand for sector I 
      XI denote total output of sector I 





Where X IJ = ij , YI =∑ i and X I = ∑∑







a ij = value of commodity i required to produce 1 rupee worth of output j = X i j / X j 
a IJ = value of commodity I required to produce 1 rupee worth of output J = X IJ / X J = ( ij )/( ∑∑
∈∈ I iJ j
X ∑
∈J j
X j)  
 
 Define, the semi–aggregate coefficient  





Finally, a IJ = ( j × a Ij)/ X J  ∑
∈J j
X
Thus, the aggregate coefficient is a weighted average of the semi aggregate coefficients belonging to its large 
industry of destination, where the weights are the proportion of the small disaggregated sector in the production 




















 Appendix B: Procedure for aggregating the (130 X 130) matrix of 2003-2004 into a 46 X 46 matrix. 
The aggregation of 130sectors into 46 broad sectors follows the following pattern:  
FINAL 
SECTORS  FINAL SECTOR NAMES 
COMPONENT SECTORS NUMBER 
from CSO ’s original table
#1  Major Food Crops and their products  1,2,3,4,5,6,7
#2 Other  Crops  8,9,10,11,12,13,16,17,18,19,20
#3 Tea  and  Coffee  14,15,42
#4  Milk and Milk Products  21
5  Animal services (agricultural)  22
#6 other  animal  products  23,24,26
#7 Forestry  and  Logging  25
#8  Coal and Lignite  27
9  Crude Petroleum and natural gas  28,29
10 Iron  Ore  30
11 Other  Minerals  31,32,33,34,35,36,37
#12 Sugar  38,39
#13 Edible  Oil  40,41
#14  Misc. Food Products  43
#15 Beverages  44
#16 Tobacco  Products  45
#17 Textiles  46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53
#18  Furniture, Fixtures and Wooden Goods  55,56
#19 Stationary  57,58
#20  Leather and Rubber Products  59,60,61
#21 Misc.  Manufacturing  62,101,102,103,104,100
#22 Petroleum  Products  63
23  Coal tar products  64
24 Heavy  chemicals  65,66
25  Other Chemical and Chemical Goods  67,68,69,72,73
#26 Health  70,122
#27 Toiletries  71
28  Non Metallic mineral Products  74,76
29 Cement  75
#30 Metal  Products  77,78,79,80,81,82
31 Agricultural  Machinery  83
32  Other Machinery(Mainly Industrial)  84,85,86,87
33  Electrical, Electronic Machines and Appliances  88,89,90,91,92,93,94
#34 Transport  Equipment  95,96,97,98,99,100
35 Construction  106
#36 Electricity  107
#37 Water  Supply  108
#38 Transport  Services  109,110,111,112,113
39 Storage  Warehousing  114
40  Other Services and Communication  115,123,124,125,126,127,128,129 
41 Trade  116
#42 Hotels  and  Restaurants  117
43  Banks and Insurance  118,11944  Ownership of Dwellings  120
#45 Education  121
46 Public  Administration  130
 
NB. # denotes categories for which NSS has household consumption information. For other categories, 





























 Appendix C: Sources of Elasticity Estimates 
Let this be the matrix of marshallian price elasticities and income demand elasticities of a particular class from a 
particular sector. We know the budget shares of the 5 commodities for this class from NSSO data 
 
   Coal  Pet  Gas  Kerosene  Others  Income 
Coal  A11 A21 A31 A41  A51 A1 
Pet  A12 A22 A32 A42  A52 A2 
Gas  A13 A23 A33 A43  A53 A3 
Kerosene  A14 A24 A34 A44  A54 A4 
Others  A15 A25 A35 A45  A55 A5 
TABLE A: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Income Elasticities 
 Coal  Pet  Gas  Kerosene  Others 
Coal  B11 B21 B31 B41  B51 
Pet  B12 B22 B32 B42  B52 
Gas  B13 B23 B33 B43  B53 
Kerosene  B14 B24 B34 B44  B54 
Others  B15 B25 B35 B45  B55 
TABLE B: Hicksian Price Elasticities and Budget Share 
 
First, consider the Rural Sector: 
B33, B34, B44, B43 are obtained from Gundimeda and Kohlin (2006).They have this information for 3 rural 
classes: low income, high income and middle income. We assume our poor have the elasticities corresponding 
to low income group and our rich have elasticities corresponding to our high income group. 
No information is available on B12,B32,B42,B21,B23,B24.We assume then to be 0 since there is no reason to 
expect strong complimentarity or strong substitutability between cooking fuels and transport fuels. We know 
A22 and A2 from time series study by Geetha and Ramanathan (1998).Using the Slutsky Equation we have 
B22. 
We don’t have estimates for B11, B13, B14, B31 and B41. We assume that the relationship between coal and 
other goods will be similar to the relationship between firewood and other goods, as both this fuels are generally 
used by users with similar profiles. We obtain these estimates from Gundimeda and Kohlin (2006).The value 
for A1 is also obtained from Kohlin and Gundimeda (2006) assuming the value is similar to income elasticity of 
firewood with respect to income.  
Now we have values for Bji j=1, 2, 3, 4and i=1, 2, 3, 4.We know that the sum of compensated price elasticities 
are equal to zero. Using this we can easily calculate B5i , i=1,2,3,4. 
Now the only thing that is not known is the last row of matrix B. Since we know Bji ( j=1,2,3,4,5 and i=1,2,3,4 ),  
Aj ( j=1,2,3,4) and the budget shares, we can calculate Aji , j=1,2,3,4,5 and i=1,2,3,4.Now using the Cournot Aggregation Rule e can calculate A15,A25,A35,A45 and A55. Using the condition that the sum of income 
elasticity and Marshallian price elasticities is zero, we obtain A5. 
Now that we have information on A51,A52,A53,A54,A55,A5 and the budget shares, we calculate 
B51,B52,B53,B54 and B55 using the Slutsky equation. Now we have the whole B matrix that is required to do 
the sensitivity check. 
 
First, consider the Urban Sector: 
B33, B34, B44, B43 are obtained from Gundimeda and Kohlin (2006).They have this information for 3 rural 
classes: low income, high income and middle income. We assume our poor have the elasticities corresponding 
to low income group and our rich have elasticities corresponding to our high income group. 
No information is available on B12,B32,B42,B21,B23,B24.We assume then to be 0 since there is no reason to 
expect strong complimentarity or strong substitutability between cooking fuels and transport fuels. We know 
A22 and A2 from time series study by Geetha and Ramanathan (1998).Using the Slutsky Equation we have 
B22. 
We don’t have estimates for B11, B13, B14, B31 and B41.We obtain estimates for A11, A41, A14 from the 
paper by Kohlin and Gupta (2006) paper on Calcutta. For estimates of B13, B31 and A1,we assume that the 
relationship between coal and other goods will be similar to the relationship between firewood and other goods, 
as both this fuels are generally used by users with similar profiles. We obtain these estimates from Gundimeda 
and Kohlin (2006).The value for A13 can also obtained from Kohlin and Gupta (2006).However the estimation 
this paper shows a counterintuitive sign. I couldn’t find any reason for such a result. Thus we make a stronger 
assumption, and use the Gundimeda and Kohlin (2006) values for B13 and B31. B11, B41 and B14 are obtained 
using Slutsky equation (we know A11, A41, A14, A1, A4 and budget shares). 
Now we have values for Bji j=1, 2, 3, 4and i=1, 2, 3, 4.We know that the sum of compensated price elasticities 
are equal to zero. Using this we can easily calculate B5i , i=1,2,3,4. 
Now the only thing that is not known is the last row of matrix B. Since we know Bji ( j=1,2,3,4,5 and i=1,2,3,4 ),  
Aj ( j=1,2,3,4) and the budget shares, we can fill in the Aji , j=1,2,3,4,5 and i=1,2,3,4,that are not known. Now 
using the Cournot Aggregation Rule we can calculate A15, A25, A35, A45 and A55. Using the condition that 
the sum of income elasticity and Marshallian price elasticities is zero, we obtain A5. 
Now that we have information on A51,A52,A53,A54,A55,A5 and the budget shares, we calculate 
B51,B52,B53,B54 and B55 using the Slutsky equation. Now we have the whole B matrix that is required to do 
the sensitivity check. 
 
 
 Appendix D: 
CODE FUEL  RURAL URBAN 
1 Coke,  Coal  0.79 2.79 
2  Firewood and Chips  75.26 21.75 
3 Cooking  Gas  8.62 57.22 
4 Gobar  Gas  0.25 0.02 
5 Dung  cake  9.1 1.73 
6 Charcoal  0.03 0.04 
7 Kerosene  1.26 10.24 
8 Electricity  0.03 0.21 
9 Others    3.33 1.12 
10 No  Cooking  Arrangement  1.34 4.88 
Table D1:Primary Cooking Fuel Usage, Percentage of Households 
 
 
CODE FUEL  RURAL  URBAN 
1 Kerosene  44.43 7.1 
2 Other  Oil  0.17 0.09 
3 Gas  0.03 0.06 
4 Candle  0.11 0.12 
5 Electricity  54.95 92.35 
6  No Lighting Arrangement  0.1 0.12 
9 Others  0.2 0.15 
Table D2 : Primary Lighting Fuel Usage, Percentage of Households 
* 
 
   Rural  Urban 
Petrol 7.3 26.3 
Diesel 0.2 0.6 
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